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WHAT LAW SCHOOLS SHOULD LEAVE BEHIND
L. Danielle Tully*
It is one thing to understand what ought to be done, quite another thing to
do it. Doing entails an act of will and may require courage and
perseverance.1
INTRODUCTION
Legal education is at a crossroads, again.2 Perhaps the more apt transportation
metaphor is that legal education is stuck in a roundabout. Crossroads require
introspection and decision-making. You can’t move past a crossroad without making
an affirmative choice. Roundabouts provide the illusion of movement while keeping
you in one place. But don’t be fooled; staying in the roundabout is still a choice.
Legal education has been in a roundabout for a while.3 The last foundational
changes came in the 1970s and 1980s with the rapid expansion of clinical education4
and the requirement, added in 1981, that law schools offer a rigorous writing
experience for law students. 5 After that, not much changed. Then, in the early
*
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1
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1611 (1986).
2
Various scholars have approached how to navigate the crossroads. See, e.g., Robert
F. Boden, Legal Education at the Crossroads, 2 COLO. LAW. 15 (1972); Lauren Carasik,
Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 (2011);
Karen Tokarz, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Peggy Maisel & Robert F. Seibel, Legal Education
at a Crossroads: Innovation, Integration, and Pluralism Required!, 43 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 11 (2013).
3
See L. Danielle Tully, The Cultural (Re)Turn: The Case for Teaching Culturally
Responsive Lawyering, 16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 202–03 n.2 (2020) (discussing legal
education reform critiques stretching back to 1948).
4
See Minna J. Kotkin, Clinical Legal Education and the Replication of Hierarchy, 26
CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 289–91 (2019) (describing the history of legal education reform
efforts).
5
STANDARDS & RULES OF PROC. FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCHS. & INTERPRETATIONS
Standard 302(a)(ii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1981); see also Leslie M. Rose, Norm-Referenced
Grading in the Age of Carnegie: Why Criteria-Referenced Grading Is More Consistent with
Current Trends in Legal Education and How Legal Writing Can Lead the Way, 17 LEGAL
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aughts, the Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers and the Clinical Legal
Education Association’s Best Practices reports offered law schools an off-ramp.6
The visionary impulses captured by these reports, and the reform efforts behind
them, fashioned a window through which to reimagine legal education.7 From the
roundabout, law schools looked out that window and made some changes. Still, most
refused to exit. As Professors Minow and Rakoff noted in 2007:
The plain fact is that American legal education, and especially its
formative first year, remains remarkably similar to the curriculum
invented at the Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus Langdell
over a century and a quarter ago. Invented, that is, not just before the
Internet, but before the telephone; . . . not just before Brown v. Board of
Education, but before Plessy v. Ferguson.8

WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 123, 132 (2011) (discussing the expansion of legal writing
courses in the 1980s).
6
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE
S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007);
ROY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007), https://www.cleaweb.org/
Resources/Documents/best_practices-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/R45X-8ZJJ]; see also Legal
Education and Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR.
7
Following the 2007 publications, law schools held conferences addressing the need
for change and stirring reform winds. See Past Events, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUC.
BLOG, https://bestpracticeslegaled.com/events-presentations-2/past-events/ [https://perma.
cc/KC3D-769S] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (cataloging conferences sponsored by the
Institute of Law Teaching and Education of Gonzaga University School of Law, University
of Maryland School of Law, University of Washington School of Law, University of New
Mexico School of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Georgia State
Law School). In addition, the 2008 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual
Meeting featured a plenary session on “Rethinking Legal Education for the 21st Century.”
Raw Outline of “Rethinking Legal Education for the 21st Century,” LAW SCH. INNOVATION
BLOG (Jan. 5, 2008), https://lsi.typepad.com/lsi/2008/01/raw-outline-of.html [https://perma.
cc/E44U-SQWR]. Finally, law schools held symposia and law review journals published
scholarly articles on legal education reform. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, 2007 Symposium
on the Future of Legal Education, 60 VAND. L. REV. 325 (2007) (introducing and
summarizing the articles included in Vanderbilt Law Review’s 2007 Symposium on the
Future of Legal Education); Symposium: The Opportunity for Legal Education, 59 MERCER
L. REV. 821 (2008) (publishing two articles on legal education and transcripts from
symposium sessions); Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s Wicked
Problems, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867 (2009) (lead article in Rutgers Law Review: 2009
Symposium: A Legal Education Prospectus: Law Schools & Emerging Frontiers).
8
Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 597, 597 (2007).
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Since then, that visionary window has become a mirror: merely reflecting and
validating the slightly altered form law schools have taken.9 For example, the 2014
amendments to the ABA Standards on the Program of Legal Education
(“Standards”) portended seismic changes, but the results have been
underwhelming.10 These proposed Standards aimed to close the long-recognized gap
between what law schools teach and what lawyers need to know to practice law
ethically in the face of ever-changing social, economic, and cultural forces.11 Much
like before, the revised Standards seemed promising. In addition to requiring two
writing experiences and minimum credit hours for both professionalism and
experiential coursework,12 the revised Standards also required law schools to adopt
specific learning outcomes and to assess demonstrated student competencies, 13
using both formative and summative assessments. 14 These revisions, while
significant, were still insufficient.15 Like the Educating Lawyers and Best Practices
9

The metaphor of windows and mirrors has a long history in multi-cultural education
theory. Described by educator Emily Style in 1988, a mirror is meant to reflect and therefore
validate one’s existence, while a window is meant to provide fresh air and fresh perspectives,
particularly on the lived experiences of historically marginalized voices. Emily Style,
Curriculum as Window and Mirror, NAT’L SEED PROJECT, https://nationalseedproject.org/
Key-SEED-Texts/curriculum-as-window-and-mirror [https://perma.cc/4W4A-CFD3] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2022). While law schools need both windows and mirrors, now is the time to
build new windows.
10
More conferences and symposia tackled legal education reform before the ABA
formally adopted revised Standards in 2014. See, e.g., Symposium: Perspectives and
Distinctions on the Future of Legal Education, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 847 (2012) (publishing
four articles on the topic); Symposium: The Lawyer of the Future, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 337
(2013) (publishing eight articles on the topic); Symposium: The Future of the Legal
Profession, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2013) (publishing nine articles on the topic).
11
The ABA Council on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar began a
comprehensive review in 2008 and approved revisions in June 2014. The House of Delegates
concurred in August 2014. See generally A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
EDUC., REPS. & RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_for
ce.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7XS-5NUT] (examining current challenges in
American legal education and making recommendations for change). For a summary of the
efforts leading to these changes, see Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and Learning
Outcomes: Developing a Coherent, Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School Curriculum,
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 668–73 (2016).
12
See STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCHS., Standard 303
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2020–2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2020-2021/2020-21-aba-standardsand-rules-for-approval-of-law-schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GJ7-S4H5] [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS 2020–21].
13
Id. at Standard 302.
14
Id. at Standard 314.
15
See Tully, supra note 3, at 220–33 (discussing revised Standards 301 and 302 and
arguing that by allowing law schools wide latitude to adopt learning outcomes and
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reports that kicked off Standards reform, the 2014 revisions offered an off-ramp.16
Law school committees convened, they studied, they reported, they tinkered. Yet,
by and large, law school curricula remained stuck in the roundabout, particularly the
1L year.17
Then, 2020 disrupted this lull. Amid a polarizing political climate, statesanctioned violence, and the coronavirus pandemic, students said enough.18 They
were right: Enough. Staying in the roundabout right now, choosing the status quo,
might be expedient; but it’s also the wrong answer. After thirty-some-odd years of
law review articles and conferences filled with “tipping-points,” “crossroads,” and
“crises,” it’s time to make significant changes. These changes should start with the
1L year.19 We know that first-year curriculum socializes future lawyers and shapes
the legal profession.20 As a result, law schools must reconstruct the first year and
assessment methods the ABA did not address the enduring critique that law schools fail to
integrate skills, values, and knowledge in the first year).
16
Numerous scholarly articles heralded the changes and offered pathways for reform.
See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, A Simple Low-Cost Institutional Learning-Outcomes
Assessment Process, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489 (2018) (describing a model to meet ABArequired institutional outcome-measures assessments); Niedwiecki, supra note 11, at 688–
92 (describing the curricular planning and development process used by The John Marshall
Law School and suggesting a process that complies with new ABA standards); Abigail
Loftus DeBlasis & Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Unrealized Potential: How Shifting the Focus
to Student Learning Outcomes Could Reduce Law Student Distress, 95 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 179 (2018) (identifying opportunities presented by Standards 302, 314, and 315 and
offering a “solutions” toolkit).
17
See Jamie R. Abrams, Legal Education’s Curricular Tipping Point Toward Inclusive
Socratic Teaching, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 900 (2021) (noting that the Socratic method,
in particular, still dominates first-year classes); Joan W. Howarth, What Law Must Lawyers
Know?, 19 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 7 (2019) (“The remarkable staying power of the
Langdellian first year curriculum rests on the usefulness of these doctrinal subjects as
platforms for teaching and learning methods of analysis, not the necessity for or even
likelihood of using the doctrinal knowledge in practice.”).
18
See, e.g., Tyler Ambrose, Zarinah Mustafa & Sherin Nassar, Law Schools’
Complicity on Racism Must Be Challenged, THE APPEAL (June 24, 2020),
https://theappeal.org/law-schools-racism/ [https://perma.cc/NG6U-JP7H]; Ronald Weich,
Student Demands: How Should Law Schools and Their Deans Respond?, 52 U. TOL. L. REV.
343 (2021); Sarah J. Schendel, Listen!: Amplifying the Experiences of Black Law School
Graduates in 2020, 100 NEB. L. REV. 73 (2021).
19
This argument has also been made before. See, e.g., Rakoff & Minow, supra note 8,
at 600–03 (critiquing the enduring power of the Langdellian case method, which is backward
looking from the perspective of the edited appellate case, and arguing for a “facts-forward”
approach based on problem-solving); THE NEW 1L: FIRST-YEAR LAWYERING WITH CLIENTS
(Eduardo R. C. Capulong, Michael A. Millemann, Sara Rankin & Nantiya Ruan, eds., 2015)
(arguing that the 1L year must integrate theory and practice and discussing a range of models
that meet this proposal).
20
See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5–6. The Educating Lawyers report observed
that the first months of law school provide “rapid socialization into the standards of legal
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provide students with opportunities to develop the mindset and skills essential not
only for competent law practice but to advance equity and justice. In contrast to the
status quo, a reimagined 1L year would meet our students where they are now, not
where they were (and who they were) one hundred years ago.21 To start this project,
to move toward action-oriented change that actually builds an inclusive and
equitable law school for all its constituents, the first question isn’t what are we
willing to add?—ABA requirements, trainings, book groups, committees, courses—
but, what are we willing to give up?22
In this Essay, I argue that to prepare future lawyers to build a more equitable,
inclusive, and just profession, law schools must first relinquish three things: the
faculty caste system and the distinction between doctrine and skills that it reflects;
high-stakes, summative exams; and the curve. Part I briefly sketches out the
problem. This section is brief because every word of it has been said before. Part II
describes the three structural and pedagogical choices law schools must abandon.
This section asserts that without giving up all three, law schools will not exit the
legal education roundabout they have chosen to remain in for so long. This Essay
concludes with a plea: let 2022 be the last year filled with we are at a crossroads
essays for a while. Let’s get about the work, the real work, by ceding both space and
power so that we can build something better for our students and for our collective
selves.

thinking” (Observation 1) and that this socialization occurs mostly through the case method,
which provides students with a “deep, largely uncritical level” of understanding (Observation
2). Id.
21
For useful context on current law students, see Tiffany D. Atkins, #ForTheCulture:
Generation Z and the Future of Legal Education, 26 MICH. J. RACE & L. 115 (2020). For
background on how K-12 curriculum changes resulting from No Child Left Behind impacted
the cognitive skills of incoming law students, see Sandra Simpson, Law Students Left Behind:
Law School’s Role in Remedying the Devastating Effects of Federal Education Policy, 107
MINN. L. REV (forthcoming 2023).
22
For suggestions on adopting culturally responsive lawyering as a curricular
framework, see Tully, supra note 3.

842

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

I. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Students are drained, 23 faculties are unhelpfully divided, 24 bar passage rates
remain low,25 student debt is at an all-time high,26 and graduates still aren’t prepared
to practice upon graduation.27 While law schools “work” for some students, they
23

See LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, THE COVID CRISIS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION: 2021 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS 11–13 (2021), https://lssse.indiana.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/COVID-Crisis-in-Legal-Education-Final-10.28.21.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/VK7Q-4LKG] [hereinafter LSSSE 2021 SURVEY] (reflecting declining quality of life
for students).
24
See, e.g., Renee Nicole Allen, Alicia Jackson & DeShun Harris, The Pink Ghetto
Pipeline: Challenges and Opportunities for Women in Legal Education, 96 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 525 (2019) (discussing myriad unhelpful divisions among faculty); John Cook,
Taking a Shot at the (Unmodified) Title: The Value of the Title “Professor of Law” for
Improving the Status of Legal Writing Faculty and ALWD/LWI Survey Trends, 24 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 65, 67 (2020) (describing the titular division among
faculty and arguing that it reflects an actual division); Ted Becker, Marci A. Rosenthal, Grant
Christensen, Elizabeth Fishman, Elizabeth Frost, Kimberly Holst, Gail Mullins, Meredith
Stange & Carolyn Williams, Report of the Institutional Survey, LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 89
(2019–2020) (describing various voting distinctions between legal writing faculty based on
employment track); Meera E. Deo, The Ugly Truth about Legal Academia, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 943 (2015) (describing results from the Diversity in Legal Academia study and
concluding that intersectional bias creates barriers to success for non-traditional law faculty,
particularly female faculty of color).
25
First-time bar-taker pass rates have fluctuated in the past decade between a low of
62% and a high of 85%, while pass-rates for repeat-takers has been falling. See ACCESSLEX
INSTITUTE, LEGAL EDUCATION DATA DECK: KEY TRENDS ON ACCESS, AFFORDABILITY, AND
VALUE 24 (Nov. 2019), https://www.accesslex.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/AccessLex_
Legal%20Education_DataDeck.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CNN7-HX2N]
[hereinafter
ACCESSLEX DATA DECK] (graphing bar passage rates from 2009–2018); A.B.A., Profile of
the Legal Profession 2021 59–62 (July 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/news/2021/0721/polp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDU-Z9J6] (graphing bar
passage rates from 2008–2020). For granular data on bar passage rates, see NAT’L CONF.
BAR EXAMRS, https://www.ncbex.org/statistics-and-research [https://perma.cc/TNF4PU7Q] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
26
LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF
LEGAL EDUCATION: A 15-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 10 (2020) https://lssse.indiana.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/LSSSE_Annual-Report_Winter2020_Final-2.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FLT5-PUJM] [hereinafter LSSSE Retrospective] (explaining dramatic debt increases and
noting that students of color owe significantly more today than fifteen years ago).
Additionally, a high percentage of law students enter law school with undergraduate debt.
ACCESSLEX DATA DECK, supra note 25, at 18 (noting that nearly half of all law students
entered law school with debt and in 2015–2016 the median amount still owed was $25,500).
While this data reveals that overall borrowing declined between 2012 and 2016, average
borrowing for law school still exceeded $120,000. Id. at 21.
27
See Milan Markovic, The Law Professor Pipeline, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 833 (2020)
(noting that law students graduate “unprepared to represent lower-income individuals and to
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don’t work for most.28 Instead, legal education is perpetuating and even building
new forms of inequality while fostering profoundly unhealthy professional practices.
Recent studies recount high rates of burnout, depression, and substance abuse for
law students, law professors, and lawyers.29
There is no shortage of evidence that law schools produce negative
psychological effects for students. 30 After the first year, students who have lost
confidence don’t readily regain it. And those who didn’t acquire fundamental
analytical skills don’t quickly recover to learn more complex material. Even with
growing support for the well-being movement, which began over thirty years ago,
many of traditional legal education’s stressors remain. Unhealthy levels of anxiety
and stress “interfere with receiving and processing information, affecting ‘not only
cognitive aspects of learning but emotional and attitudinal components as well.’”31
There are many who would say that law school stress is minimal compared to the
pressures of actual practice, when the profound weight of client representation
comes to bear: real deadlines, real people, real rights, real costs. Perhaps. But law
school stressors—particularly in the first year—don’t mimic real-life’s stressors, and
these law school stressors work against the goal of building a healthy, ethical
profession.
address their complex mix of legal and socioeconomic needs.”); Howarth, supra note 17, at
5 (explaining that “most law schools have been extremely focused on the academic study of
law, not preparation for the practice of law.”); Dyane L. O’Leary, “Smart” Lawyering:
Integrating Technology Competence into the Legal Practice Curriculum, 19 U.N.H. L. REV.
197 (2021) (noting that students graduate without sufficient exposure to legal tech and law
schools have a duty to incorporate technology competence into their required curricula).
28
While data suggests most students are generally content with their educational
experience, it also reveals students do not uniformly feel a sense of value and belonging in
their law schools. See LAW SCH. SURV. OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, DIVERSITY AND
EXCLUSION: 2020 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS 5 (2020), https://lssse.indiana.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Diversity-and-Exclusion-Final-9.29.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GZ
X-Y73J] [hereinafter LSSSE 2020 SURVEY].
29
Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Stress, Grief, and Mental Health Challenges in the
Legal Profession; Not Your Usual Law Review Article, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2567–
70 (2021) (summarizing data on mental health issues in the legal profession and underlying
causes); see generally Jonathan Koltai, Scott Schieman, & Ronit Dinovitzer, The Status–
Health Paradox: Organizational Context, Stress Exposure, and Well-being in the Legal
Profession, 59 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 20 (2018) (discussing depression, overwork, and
work-life conflict in the legal profession).
30
See, e.g., Kathryne M. Young, Understanding the Social and Cognitive Processes in
Law School that Create Unhealthy Lawyers, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2575 (2021)
(summarizing data from a 2020 study based on interviews with fifty-three law students at
thirty-six different law schools and concluding that early law school socialization has
negative social and cognitive effects on students); Rose, supra note 5, at 140 n.106 (citing
articles arguing that the negative effects on student well-being begin in the first year); Susan
A. Bandes, Feeling and Thinking Like a Lawyer: Cognition, Emotion, and the Practice and
Progress of Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2427, 2431 (2021) (arguing that law schools
marginalize emotion in legal reasoning, which has “tremendous psychic costs.”).
31
Rose, supra note 5, at 141–42 (internal citation omitted).

844

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Both the curriculum students encounter and the way that professors present it
to them contribute to first-year students feeling alienated from the material they are
studying. Of course, the 1L curriculum has experienced some meaningful changes
in recent decades. Classrooms are less authoritarian. Faculties are more diverse;
more first-year “skills faculty” are hired into tenure-line or tenure-line equivalent
positions. 32 Law schools have adjusted credits, added courses, and expanded
opportunities for experiential learning.33 In addition, a growing number of first-year
casebook professors and those teaching upper-level courses have integrated critical
perspectives into their classrooms.34 These changes are significant: what’s included
in the curriculum and what’s omitted—whether in casebook or legal writing
classes—tell law students what’s important and what’s not. Moreover, these choices
tell law students whose stories are important and whose are not. 35 As Professor
Akbar has argued: “In classrooms and court opinions, what goes named and
unnamed generates a view of how the world is and how it should be—even how it
could be.”36

32
Here, I use “skills faculty” to describe those faculty who teach legal writing, as well
as those who teach legal research and other experiential courses such as negotiation,
mediation, counseling, drafting, and law clinics.
33
See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C.J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 247, 256–62 (2012) (summarizing law school innovations).
34
See, e.g., Boston University School of Law Symposium on Racial Bias, Disparities
and Oppression in the 1L Curriculum: A Critical Approach to Canonical First Year Law
School Subjects, B.U. SCH. L. (Feb. 28–29, 2020), http://www.bu.edu/law/2019/12/12/racialbias-disparities-and-oppression-in-the-1l-curriculum/ [https://perma.cc/Q8QZ-XN25]. This
symposium brought together faculty and students to explore how to build “an inclusive,
rigorous, and critical first-year legal education that empowers students to be effective legal
professionals.” Id. Sources are being collected and shared. See, e.g., Critical Perspectives
Reading
List:
1L
Curriculum,
SEATTLE
UNIV.
L.
LIBR.,
https://lawlibguides.seattleu.edu/criticalperspectives [https://perma.cc/NBQ5-NLHW] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2022); Diversity Readings Related to First-Year Courses, U. WASH. SCH. L.,
https://guides.lib.uw.edu/law/diversity1L [https://perma.cc/NZ5M-6VMV] (last visited Jan.
30, 2022). Scholars are critiquing core 1L courses and offering new approaches. See, e.g.,
Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1631
(2020). New casebooks are also being published. See, e.g., BROOKE COLEMAN, SUZETTE
MALVEAUZ, PORTIA PEDRO, AND ELIZABETH PORTER, A GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE:
INTEGRATING CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2022).
35
See Bandes, supra note 30, at 2427–29 (recounting the explicit and implicit messages
students receive about what is important to lawyering and noting that personal experience
and emotions are not valued); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From
the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 61 (1995) (“[C]asebooks have the
power to influence students’ and readers’ views beyond the closed confines of classroom
black-letter law.”).
36
Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 352, 368 (2015) (emphasis in original).
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Still, most first-year courses are taught from casebooks containing edited
appellate decisions.37 These casebooks have been tweaked and revised: new cases
and concepts appear while others are erased. New and more diverse voices are being
included. But by and large, casebooks and the case method remain paramount.38
Students are assigned pages of edited appellate decisions to read and brief before
each class. Once in their seats, first-year law professors begin some version of a
Socratic dialogue to help students extract legal rules from the assigned decisions.39
As Professor Jamie Abrams notes, “[t]he Socratic method . . . fortifies law school
budgets in its efficiency, scalability, and its high faculty-to-student ratios.” 40
However, this same method—particularly when used in large, curve-based, firstyear casebook courses with limited assessments or opportunities for constructive
feedback—hinders student learning.
In most law schools, legal writing is the only first-year course that does not rely
on casebooks or the Socratic dialogue. This course focuses on lawyering skills—like
mastering predictive analysis and professional communication. While legal writing
courses aim to prepare students for practice, concepts such as cultural sensibility,
social cognition, and professional identity formation remain on the margins. A
welcome movement is afoot, though, as more professors interrogate the core 1L
lawyering curriculum.41
Meaningful changes are occurring in other areas as well. Across the country,
law schools have created new positions and recruited faculty to serve in roles

37
See L. Danielle Tully, Professional Identity Formation as a Power Skill, 1 PROC.
ONLINE J. LEGAL WRITING CONF. PRESENTATIONS 1 (2020).
38
Rakoff & Minow, supra note 8, at 599–600.
39
Abrams, supra note 17, at 900.
40
Id.
41
Recent legal writing conferences have focused on interrogating and expanding the
discipline. For example, in 2017, the Association of Legal Writing Directors (“ALWD”)
dedicated its biennial conference to diversity and inclusion, which was reflected in the theme:
Acknowledging Lines: Talking About What Unites Us and Divides Us. 2017 AWLD
Conference, UNIV. OF MINN., http://alwd.umn.edu [https://perma.cc/DY7D-RSJE] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2022). In December 2021, the Legal Writing Institute (“LWI”) hosted a series
of one-day conferences that included sessions addressing language, professional identity
formation, and cultural humility in legal writing. See, e.g., LWI One-Day Workshop at the
Brandeis School of Law, the University of Louisville, LEGAL WRITING INST. (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://www.lwionline.org/sites/default/files/2021Louisville.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GDZF8QZ]. Discipline-building efforts are underway in scholarship as well. See, e.g., Sherri Lee
Keene & Susan A. McMahon, The Contextual Case Method: Moving Beyond Opinions to
Spark Students’ Legal Imaginations, 108 VIR. L. REV. ONLINE 72 (2022); Leslie Patrice
Culver, (Un)Wicked Analytical Frameworks and the Cry for Identity, 21 NEV. L.J. 655
(2021); Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucy Jewel & Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Gut Renovations:
Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How the Law Addresses Privilege and
Power, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 205 (2020).
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focused on diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging.42 Finally, new resources like
the Law Deans Anti-Racist Clearinghouse Project, hosted on the AALS website, are
being curated and shared.43
Again, these changes are commendable. But even where law faculty and law
schools have made such changes, they have largely ignored how their assessment
structures work against inclusive and equitable learning experiences. Further, while
touting the value of anti-racist education, they have ignored their own entrenched
and profoundly unequal institutional hierarchies. Certainly, progress has been made
since 2004 when Professor Stanchi specifically called on egalitarian and feminist
law professors and deans to “fight the inequality in their own backyards.”44 But so
much more can and should be done. Because of caste-like hierarchies, many faculty
who teach legal writing, research, and academic support—faculty who have a clear
perspective on the skills and experiences students bring to their law study and who
have well-supported ideas about what can and should be done to improve legal
education—still have little to no power to make any changes on their own.45
Meaningful, enduring change cannot occur without all law school stakeholders
deeply engaging in reform efforts.46 Like the clinical movement that transformed
upper-level law school curricula, this new movement to rebuild the first year will
require that law school faculties interrogate the skills, values, and knowledge future
lawyers need. While bar passage and job placement will remain important, faculties
must also focus on what future lawyers need to thrive in and contribute to a more
42

See, e.g., Equity, Inclusion & Belonging at William & Mary Law School, WM. &
MARY L. SCH., https://law.wm.edu/about/equity-inclusion-belonging-at-wmlawschool/ind
ex.php [https://perma.cc/9HBQ-UKHX] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022) (announcing new
initiatives and a new administrative position focused on equity, inclusion, and antiracism);
Mary Wood, Mark Jefferson Named Inaugural Assistant Dean for Diversity, Equity and
Belonging, UNIV. VA. SCH. L. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/202103/
mark-jefferson-named-inaugural-assistant-dean-diversity-equity-and-belonging [https://pe
rma.cc/Z7DN-6G37] (announcing UVA law school’s first Assistant Dean for diversity,
equity, and belonging); Diversity, Equity and Inclusion, STURM COLL. L.,
https://www.law.du.edu/about/diversity-and-inclusive-excellence [https://perma.cc/U3WUHSNM] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022) (linking to efforts at University of Denver Sturm College
of Law to support diversity and equity).
43
See Law Dean Antiracist Clearinghouse Project, ASS’N AM. L. SCH.,
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/antiracist-clearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/7WVSQU9G] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022). The American Association of Law Libraries revised and
updated its resource page on DEI. See Diversity and Inclusion Resource Guide: Diversity &
Inclusion in Law Libraries-Resources, AM. ASS’N L. LIBR. (May 4, 2021),
https://www.aallnet.org/about-us/who-we-are/committees-juries/diversity-inclusion-commi
ttee/diversity-inclusion-resource-guide/ [https://perma.cc/QP9L-5YYQ].
44
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status
Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 467, 469 (2004).
45
See Allen et al., supra note 24, at 541–44 (discussing how skills work is coded
female, which has consequences for faculty influence in the law school environment).
46
See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing the impact of faculty hierarchies on
curricular and institutional reform).
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healthy, equitable, and just profession. Currently, law schools are “incubators of
inequality.”47 Without concerted efforts to reimagine legal education—particularly
the pivotal first year—law schools will continue to function this way.48
II. WHAT LAW SCHOOLS NEED TO GIVE UP
Before law schools can reimagine and rebuild legal education, those who
govern them must first remove the enduring obstacles that produce and reproduce
unnecessary inequality: faculty caste systems, high-stakes exams, and the curve.
A. Faculty Caste Systems
Legal education is shrouded in stories of gatekeeping and exclusion. A vast and
growing body of literature spanning decades captures the vagaries and vicissitudes
of law school hierarchies. 49 Among full-time faculty, most schools currently
maintain at least five tiers: casebook, clinical, legal writing, academic success, and
law librarians. 50 Placement on a particular rung generally denotes a faculty

47

Alexa Chew & Rachel Gurvich, Saying the Quiet Parts Out Loud: Teaching Students
How Law School Works, 100 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3).
48
Much has been written about how legal education succeeds at its not-so-explicit aim
of reproducing the “actual patterns of hierarchy and domination.” Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 591 (1982); see
generally Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155 (2008); Teri
A. McMurtry-Chubb, Writing at the Master’s Table: Reflections on Theft, Criminality, and
Otherness in the Legal Writing Profession, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 41 (2010); Rachel López,
Unentitled: The Power of Designation in the Legal Academy, 73 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 923
(2021).
49
The literature on this subject is legion. For a small sampling, see, e.g., Maureen J.
Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 117 (1997); Susan P. Liemer, The Hierarchy of Law School Faculty Meetings:
Who Votes?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 351 (2004); Kotkin, supra note 4; Rachel Arnow-Richman,
Integrated Learning, Integrated Faculty, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 745, 746–47 (2020).
50
Law school castes can be sliced in many ways. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, The Caste
System and Best Practices in Legal Education, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 12, 13–16
(2002) (identifying seven castes in American law schools: tenure-line faculty, deans, clinical
faculty, law library directors, legal writing directors and faculty, adjunct faculty, and
professional staff); Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 758–59 (discussing legal education’s
evolution and the creation of the bifurcated faculty model). Importantly, Academic Support
and Bar Preparation positions are relatively new to the law faculty hierarchy. Many law
schools have created or expanded these roles to address bar passage rates among other
teaching and learning objectives. See Allen et al., supra note 24, at 537 (noting that the ABA
has identified academic support as one way for law schools to demonstrate that they are
offering students “a reasonable opportunity” to complete the program of legal education as
required by Standard 309(b)).

848

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

member’s power within the institution along with access to both monetary and nonmonetary rewards.51
Law faculty hierarchies are built on biased categories. 52 In her article,
Unentitled: The Power of Designation in the Legal Academy, Professor Rachel
López recounts the virtual “cottage industry” of labels and designations.53 These
labels and designations are created and supported by those who govern law
schools—sometimes faculty, sometimes boards, often a mix—and they are
reinforced by ABA Standards for tenure and the law school “Professional
Environment.”54 Rather than functioning as mere labels, these status distinctions are
containers.55 They limit faculty’s ability to collaborate, innovate, and integrate best
practices for legal education across the curriculum by reifying silos conceptualized
around the arbitrary and inaccurate distinction between doctrine and skills. 56 As
Professor Arnow-Richmans notes:

51

See Lucille A. Jewel, Oil and Water: How Legal Education’s Doctrine and Skills
Divide Reproduces Toxic Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 112–13, n.2 (2015)
(cataloging thirty years of scholarship on treating “skills” professors as “second-class
citizens”).
52
See Kathryn Stanchi, The Problem with ABA Standard 405(c), 66 J. LEGAL EDUC.
558, 560 (2017) (critiquing faculty hierarchies and the categorical thinking that underpins
them). For a breakdown of faculty by status see J. Lyn Entrikin, Lucy Jewel, Susie Salmon,
Craig T. Smith, Kristen K. Tiscione & Melissa H. Weresh, Treating Professionals
Professionally: Requiring Security of Position for All Skills-Focused Faculty Under ABA
Accreditation Standard 405(c) and Eliminating 405(d), 98 OR. L. REV. 1, 20–26 (2020).
53
López, supra note 48, at 925.
54
See Mary Beth Beazley, Shouting into the Wind: How the ABA Standards Promote
Inequality in Legal Education, and What Law Students and Faculty Should Do About It, 65
VILL. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2020) (noting that ABA Standard 405(c) “declared that a system
of tenure was not necessary for those full-time faculty who taught what the rule called
‘professional skills,’ stating that a law school need afford them only a ‘form of security of
position reasonably similar to tenure, and perquisites reasonably similar to those provided
other full-time faculty members’”).
55
See Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory Can Teach Us
about the Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181, 183 (2014).
56
Using the term “doctrinal” to denote only those subjects taught by casebook
professors is underinclusive. See Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: A Doctrinal Course, 1
SAVANNAH L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2014) (demonstrating how legal writing is “doctrinal”). The
skills/doctrine divide emerged alongside the clinical movement and the expansion of
experiential courses meant to get law students “practice ready.” See Jewel, supra note 51, at
114. Beyond the negative impact these categories have on legal education, Professor Sara
Ochs argues that they also seed and nurture imposter syndrome in professors. Sara L. Ochs,
Imposter Syndrome & The Law School Caste System, 42 PACE L. REV. 373 (2022).
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[T]he bifurcated faculty is rooted in longstanding, deeply embedded
stereotypes about the academic rigor of skills courses and the intellectual
capacity of skills teachers. The interaction between these ingrained beliefs
and the personnel practices they have engendered ensures that skills
education remains segregated and devalued along with those who teach
it.57
These containers also ensure that the skills/doctrine divide dominates everything
from course content to the physical law school environment. Although faculty
teaching skills courses have long been lauded as essential, and their courses have
been required by the ABA, most tenure-line positions are held by casebook
professors (referred to by many as doctrinal or podium professors).58 Tenure-line
faculty are expected to meet standards of excellence on three pillars—scholarship,
teaching, and service—but they are principally evaluated on their scholarly
productivity.59 They also function as “governing” faculty with the power to vote on
matters from curriculum changes to faculty hiring and promotion.60 Faculty who
hold these positions receive the highest compensation and strongest job protection.61
Some law schools provide unitary tenure track positions for both clinical and
legal writing faculty, and this number has grown in the last decade. These institutions
treat faculty who teach skills courses as equal colleagues and full partners in their
institutions’ missions. More legal writing professors are also becoming deans and
associate deans, a testament to their institutional value. Still, these stories remain the
exception. Across the country, many “skills faculty” are still hired on contingent
contracts.62 They are evaluated primarily on their teaching and service and are often

57

Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 758.
See Stanchi, supra note 52, at 560 (noting that “[f]aculty who teach ‘substantive’
subjects are presumed to deserve tenure; clinicians and legal writing faculty are presumed
not to deserve it.”).
59
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 753 (noting “[d]octrinal faculty are judged
principally on their scholarship”).
60
Liemer, supra note 49. As Professor Liemer noted in her 2004 article, “There seem
to be almost as many ways to configure who votes on what at faculty meetings as there are
law schools. At some schools, everyone votes; at others, no one off the traditional tenure
track votes. At one school the clinicians vote, and the legal writing professors do not.” Id. at
361. For a breakdown of voting rights by legal writing employment type, see ASS’N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS, LWI/ALWD Legal Writing Survey, 2019–2020, 89 (on file with the
publication).
61
See Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 19, 22.
62
See Ruth Anne Robbins, Kristen K. Tiscione & Melissa H. Weresh, Persistent
Structural Barriers to Gender Equity in the Legal Academy and the Efforts of Two Legal
Writing Organizations to Break Them Down, 65 VILL. L. REV. 1155, 1161–62 (2020)
(discussing status trends for skills faculty); Kotkin, supra note 4, at 297–99 (discussing
employment status of full-time clinical instructors between 2010-2017). For a discussion of
recent legal writing hiring trends, see Peter Nemerovski, Help Wanted: An Empirical Study
of LRW Hiring, 24 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 315 (2020).
58
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relegated to lower-paid contract positions.63 In addition, these faculty are sometimes
physically segregated from tenure-track and tenured casebook faculty and may even
have inferior office space and office location. 64 Even with their labor-intensive
teaching loads, in some institutions, legal writing faculty are required to meet the
same scholarship and service obligations as their tenure-line peers, yet they are not
eligible for tenure and they are prohibited from voting on various governance
matters.65
Despite recent moves to convert limited-term contract positions into tenuretrack and “tenure-equivalent” positions, skills positions continue to be plagued by
inequality.66 Instead of creating unitary systems with clear standards that all faculty
can meet, many law schools have ossified tiered tracks as a way to comply with the
ABA requirements for faculty tenure and security of position set out in Standard
405.67
63
Amy H. Soled, Legal Writing Professors, Salary Disparities, and the Impossibility
of “Improved Status,” 24 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 47, 48–49 (2020)
(noting that the median salary for a tenure-track associate professor is $168,840 whereas the
base salary for a legal writing professor on the tenure track is $95,664, on a long-term
contract is $72,350 and on a short-term contract is $69,083).
64
Faculty office integration resulted from consistent, decades-long efforts. See Jo Anne
Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writing Faculty in
Law Schools: Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV. 253, 257 (2004) (describing results
of the 2004 ALWD and LWI annual survey and noting that 25% of legal writing faculty
offices were located in less desirable areas, and 35% were smaller than non-LRW faculty
offices). The 2019–2020 ALWD/LWI survey reports that 89% of LRW faculty holding
universal tenure-track or tenured positions have offices integrated with non-LRW faculty
offices. Becker et al., supra note 24, at 221–22. That percentage decreased to 67% for faculty
holding full-time, long-term contracts that are not 405(c) contracts. Id.
65
See Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 25–26 (noting that 20% of all clinical and legal
writing faculty with 405(d) status were unable to vote while, 73% of legal writing faculty on
long-term contracts were expected or required to serve on committees); Allen et al., supra
note 24, at 527 (noting that women in non-tenure track clinical and legal writing faculty
positions “are second-class citizens who are often excluded from faculty governance or the
full protection of academic freedom.”).
66
See, e.g., Soled, supra note 63 (describing the enduring disparities in pay and status);
Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 746 (noting that “[a] privileged group of elitecredentialed faculty cover the doctrinal courses, while enjoying the generous compensation
and job security associated with tenure. Meanwhile an underclass of contract faculty shoulder
the more labor-intensive skills curriculum, enduring lower pay and lesser status.”); Kotkin,
supra note 4, at 297 (noting the “steady erosion in the status of clinical teachers” as more
clinical professors are hired into contract-line position without equal voting rights).
67
STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCHS., Standard 405 at
29–30 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2021–2022), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2021-2022/2021-2022-aba
-standards-and-rules-of-procedure-chapter-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WC8-DWUN]
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 2021–22]. According to a 2016–2017 study by the Center for
Applied Legal Education only 34% of full-time clinical faculty hold tenure-line positions
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Critiques of Standard 405 stretch back decades and have highlighted that it
strengthened faculty hierarchies by specifically carving out two faculty categories
that do not need access to tenure at all: clinical and legal writing faculty.68 First,
under ABA Accreditation Standard 405(c), law schools must provide clinical faculty
with “tenure-equivalent” positions, which means the possibility for a series of longterm contracts that are presumptively renewable. 69 To be clear, equivalent is not
“equal in force, amount, or value” as the Meriam Webster Dictionary definition
might suggest.70 Next, the ABA carved out a second underclass for legal writing
teachers by requiring that law schools only provide them access to “such security of
position and other rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be necessary
to (1) attract and retain a faculty that is well-qualified to provide legal writing
instruction . . . , and (2) safeguard academic freedom.” 71 Although 405(d) was
nominally meant to help legal writing faculty, it instead created another acceptable
sub-category onto which governing faculty could cling. 72 And, ultimately, as
Professor Entrikin has aptly argued: “405(d) provides no real protection for legal
writing faculty at all[]”73 while simultaneously communicating to other law school
faculty that legal writing faculty are inferior.74 Notably, despite the essential role
they play in modern legal education, there are no requirements that law schools
provide any form of job security to law librarians or professors who specialize in
either academic support or bar preparation.75
with 27% of those in unified tenure positions and 12% in programmatic tenure positions.
Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 750. Similarly, a 2018–2019 study revealed that most
legal writing programs employ professors in either short- or long-term contracts rather than
tenure-line positions. Id. at 750–51.
68
See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law
Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2001); Robbins et al., supra
note 62, at 1156; Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 15–18 (summarizing efforts to amend
Standard 405 during the 2008–2014 review process and concluding that the decision to leave
405 unchanged further entrenched faculty hierarchies).
69
ABA STANDARDS 2021–22, supra note 67, at 27–30.
70
Equivalent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar
y/equivalent [https://perma.cc/V6AN-2KT8] (last visited May 10, 2022); see Entrikin et al.,
supra note 52, at 19 (stating that Standard 405(c) diminishes the protections of academic
freedom and tenure for clinical faculty).
71
ABA STANDARDS 2021–22, supra 67, at 29.
72
See Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 21 (“Standard 405 communicates a judgment
that, regardless of their qualifications, legal writing faculty are somehow inferior to
‘faculty.’”); Tiffany Jeffers, The Choice to Stay in the Pink Ghetto, 23 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 41, 42 (2019) (noting that ABA Rule 405(d) “codified the ability of
the academy to maintain a system that is procedurally and substantively unequal.”).
73
Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 18.
74
Id. at 21.
75
Allen et al., supra note 24, at 537–38. The 2014 revisions to the ABA Standards
relating to library directors withdrew previous language acknowledging that they generally
hold tenure-track or tenured positions. Gordon Russell, The ABA Section on Legal Education
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Through both formal and informal requirements and restrictions, and
everything from workload to voting, faculty hierarchies create power structures that
animate our institutions and heavily impact the reform equation. 76 Marginalized
faculty without job security exercise academic freedom at a very real risk, if they
exercise it at all. Additionally, faculty silos and the academic caste system continue
to reproduce faculty division, which negatively impacts student learning and
prevents much-needed institutional change. 77 Ultimately, the distinctions and the
resulting inequality they produce devalue both skills professors and the subjects they
teach. “These hierarchies, in turn, communicate problematic values to students.”78
Race and gender further complicate law school faculty hierarchies. Despite
advances in other professions, and in the admissions statistics for some law schools,
law school faculties are still overwhelmingly white and male. 79 In part, that is
because law school faculty recruitment functions in a relatively closed universe, and
law schools hire from a well-defined and very small pool.80 In addition, as Professor
Meera Deo notes, most female professors are “accidental professors––folks with the
skills and expertise to excel in legal academia who just hadn’t considered this a
viable path for themselves.”81
Revisions of the Law Library Standards: What Does it All Mean? 106 L. LIB. J. 329, 353–54
(2014). After 2014, Standard 603 requires that “except in extraordinary circumstances, a law
library director shall hold a law faculty appointment with security of faculty position.” ABA
Standard 603(d). Id.
76
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 756 (noting that “[f]aculty silos are artifacts
limiting the type of curricular innovation and faculty collaboration that law schools most
need to provide a twenty-first-century education.”).
77
See Entrikin et al., supra note 52, at 12–13.
78
Abrams, supra note 17, at 919.
79
See Robert Kuehn, Shifting Law School Faculty Demographics, (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://bestpracticeslegaled.com/2022/01/05/clinical-legal-education-by-the-numbers/
[https://perma.cc/H4PM-CAZD] (last visited July 13, 2022). ABA accredited law schools
are required to include faculty demographics in their annual Standard 509 Information
Reports. For the searchable dataset, see Section of Legal Education – ABA Required
Disclosures: Standard 509 Required Disclosures, ABA, https://abarequireddisclosures.org/
Disclosure509.aspx [https://perma.cc/84DF-DHUD] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
80
This pool has become even smaller in recent years. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 294
(noting that traditional elite hiring credentials—“top-tier law degree; a law review editorship;
a prestigious, preferably federal circuit or U.S. Supreme Court clerkship; and perhaps a few
years at a big firm or an elite government agency”—are no longer sufficient and now “the
‘coin of the realm’ is a fellowship and/or an advanced degree, particularly a Ph.D.”); see also
Carliss N. Chatman & Najarian R. Peters, The Soft-Shoe and Shuffle of Law School Hiring
Committee Practices, UCLA L. REV. (May 8, 2021), https://www.uclalawreview.org/thesoft-shoe-and-shuffle-of-law-school-hiring-committee-practices/ [https://perma.cc/XRL64P2L].
81
Meera Deo (@meeradeo), TWITTER (Dec. 17, 2021, 9:45AM), https://twitter.com/
meeradeo/status/1471854014727786497 [https://perma.cc/XX6D-RXXN]; Cute as a
Button, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST (Nov. 23, 2020), https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/wp-
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In comparison to law faculties generally, women are overrepresented in skills
roles and among legal writing faculty in particular.82 In fact, legal writing faculty
work has long been considered “pink collar work,” and their members have toiled
in the “pink ghetto” of law faculties.83 Over the past two decades, approximately
70% of legal writing faculty have been female, whereas 40% of all law school
faculty in 2020 identified as female.84 Furthermore, for the 2019–2020 academic
year, 86% of the legal writing faculty identified as white.85 In part, the legal writing
discipline has remained white because of the clear bias faculty of color face in legal
academia. For example, “[w]omen of color who teach Legal Writing can be
marginalized as women, as women of color, and as faculty members teaching a
course almost universally less valued in the academy.”86 In addition, “their lack of
status can demean and silence them, as well as prevent their institutions from
benefiting from all they can contribute as scholars, teachers, and colleagues.” 87
Some prospective Black female professors have even been encouraged to apply for
tenure-track casebook positions instead of clinical, legal writing, or academic
support positions because of the “multiple marginalizations” faced by women of
color who teach skills courses.88
It is unsurprising, then, that most law students largely encounter white women
as their legal writing and academic success professors. Regardless of role, failing to
content/uploads/2020/11/Cute-as-a-Button- Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/28K6-Q3FG].
For a detailed exploration of the myriad barriers to entry into legal academia, see MEERA
DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL ACADEMIA (2019).
82
See generally Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender
Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562 (2000).
83
See id.; Lorraine K. Bannai, Challenged X 3: The Stories of Women of Color Who
Teach Legal Writing, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 275, 278–79 (2014); see also Mary
Nicol Bowman, Legal Writing as Office Housework?, 69 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (2019) (using
the office housework frame to demonstrate how and why legal writing professors’ work,
which is labor-intensive, individualized, and often requires heavy learning-centered service
loads, is devalued in law schools).
84
Becker et al., supra note 24, at 68 (noting 69.8% of 557 legal writing professors
surveyed identified as female in the 2019–2020 ALWD/LWI Legal Writing Survey).
85
Becker et al., supra note 24, at 69. In comparison, law school ABA 509 reports for
2020 indicate that 17% of all faculty and 21% of full-time faculty identify as “minority.” See
Section of Legal Education, supra note 79.
86
Bannai, supra note 83, at 279.
87
Id. at 276; see also Allen et al., supra note 24, at 543 (“[A]s women in skills positions
attempt to move up the academic ladder, they encounter resistance from other faculty
members: devaluing their scholarship, service, and even the intellectual stimulation of the
work they do.”).
88
See Bannai, supra note 83, at 276, 288 (“As a result of the low status accorded to
Legal Writing faculty, women of color are counseled to avoid—or asked why they want to
continue—teaching Legal Writing.”); McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 48, at 45 (discussing
how the status of legal writing within law schools deters women of color from becoming
legal writing professors and acknowledging that mentors “unanimously warned [her] not to
take a job as a legal writing professor.”).
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actively recruit, hire, and nurture faculty who have been historically marginalized
and kept off law faculties limits what students learn and how they experience their
legal education. 89 But, so long as status hierarchies remain, efforts to diversify
casebook tenure-line positions will negatively impact hiring faculty of color for
clinical, legal writing, and academic success positions.
ABA accrediting Standards, and the profession more generally, already require
that law schools restructure the pillars of teaching, scholarship, and service to place
greater weight on student learning and assessment. New amendments to the
Standards now also require that law schools provide “substantial opportunities” in
“the development of a professional identity”90 and education “on bias, cross-cultural
competency, and racism.”91 In addition, legal employers seek new graduates who
can demonstrate a broad range of legal skills to adeptly navigate the dynamic legal
field.92 This shift toward experiential learning and learning outcomes that address
the nuanced and complex skills required of new graduates is at direct odds with
current faculty hierarchies and the siloed structure of legal education.93 With faculty
(and course) silos in place, “[s]tudents have not been guided toward an
understanding of the intricate relationships among doctrinal, strategic, interpersonal,
and ethical analysis.”94 Furthermore, these siloes “impede[] faculty development of
the cross competencies needed to deliver an integrated curriculum.”95
Law schools can finally commit to diversifying all aspects of faculty hiring by
dismantling the extant silos, abandoning the hierarchal tracks, and replacing the
faculty structure with a unified tenure system.96 This system should be grounded in
standards for teaching, service, and scholarship that adequately reflect twenty-firstcentury standards of excellence and impact. For example, assessing excellence in
89
See Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law
Schools: One Dean’s Perspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549, 1556–65 (2011) (summarizing
educational benefits of faculty diversity); see also Abrams, supra note 17, at 919–20
(summarizing barriers faced by faculty of color in recruitment and retention and noting that
progress in diversifying faculties has languished).
90
ABA STANDARDS 2020–21, supra note 12, at 303(b)(3).
91
Id. at 303(c).
92
See generally Susan C. Wawrose, What Do Legal Employers Want to See in New
Graduates?: Using Focus Groups to Find Out, OHIO N.U. L. REV. 505 (2013); Mark A.
Cohen, What’s a Lawyer Now? Law’s Shift from Practice to Skill, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2019/09/23/whats-a-lawyer-now-laws-shiftfrom-practice-to-skill/?sh=19af8094745b [https://perma.cc/3APP-MH7E] (last visited July
13, 2022).
93
See Jewel, supra note 48 (discussing how the teaching hierarchy inhibits law schools’
ability to prepare the new generation of attorneys to be critical thinkers who create legal
reform).
94
Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon! Radical Proposals to Reform
Legal Pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 621 (2008).
95
Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 748.
96
The call for unitary employment standards is not new. See, e.g., id., at 763, n.112
(calling for unitary tenure standards and citing other scholars who argue for same); Allen et
al., supra note 24, at 547.
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teaching would require law schools to evaluate whether faculty have mastery of
various teaching and assessment approaches and adequately deploy them in their
courses to maximize learning within a diverse and dynamic student body.97 Such a
change would require law schools to truly prioritize student learning by investing in
on-going teacher training and mentorship.
Assessing excellence in service should also focus on the student. Of course,
faculty members should have numerous avenues to match their skills/interests with
areas to serve. For example, some may demonstrate excellence through creating
innovative teaching resources that can be shared with and used by other faculty.
Some may demonstrate excellence through chairing or serving on time-intensive
faculty committees. Still, others may demonstrate excellence in service by
participating in a local access-to-justice task force. However, law schools should
place more value on the particularly time-, labor-, and emotion-intensive work
relating to student learning and advancement.98
Finally, excellence in scholarship must expand to reflect the various ways in
which scholarship is produced and consumed. 99 Although traditional law review
articles play an essential role in the professoriate’s conversations with one another
and other key players in the legal profession, amicus briefs, blog posts, and even
podcasts disseminate legal theories and narratives that impact the legal profession
as well. Law professors have the mental acuity and intellectual flexibility to evaluate
their peers in sources other than traditional law reviews. Additionally, law faculty
must expand the definition of what counts as worthy of scholarly exploration.
Faculty must finally abandon the tired refrain that they just don’t know how to
evaluate legal writing, clinical, and academic success scholarship. Such narrow
thinking merely entrenches already suspect divisions.
Unified standards based on the same criteria can support increased faculty
diversity along with curricular integration and innovation, so long as those unified
standards recognize the importance of skill development and transformational
practices. Unified standards cannot simply mean that faculty who teach skills
courses are expected to do all the things they currently do and meet the unitary tenure
standards, with no more support or pay. Instead, unitary standards should ask all
professors to advance student learning, the law, and the profession. Doing so might
take various forms, but any form must value the labor-intensive work that skills
faculty already contribute and require casebook faculty (if such designation
continues to exist post-reform) to engage in more student-centered, skills-building,
labor-intensive work as well.100

97

Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 763; Allen et al., supra note 24, at 547–48
(arguing for reevaluating the value assigned to teaching and assessment efforts in faculty
reviews).
98
See Allen et al., supra note 24, at 544 (noting that law schools should “start assigning
more value to the work done in skills positions”).
99
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 763.
100
See Allen et al., supra note 24, at 548. For suggestions on appropriate pedagogical
changes to enhance flexible, higher-order thinking, see Simpson, supra note 21.
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The barriers to reform are both high and evident. First, negotiating any
reapportionment is a little like trying to shift power in a gerrymandered map. Firstyear courses are taught by a mix of faculty. Some have job security after a long road
to tenure, others hope to have it and may alter their teaching and lower their
institutional heads while on the road toward that vote, and still others have no status,
no vote—they have influence only in proximity to power. These institutional
dynamics impede reform.101 Second, flawed and enduring biases prevent governing
faculty from embracing “skills” professors as their equals, even when legal writing
and experiential courses are the only courses affirmatively required by the ABA
outside of professional responsibility. 102 These same biases prevent governing
faculty from embracing an entirely new paradigm in which such divisions disappear.
While reforms should be cultivated by faculty in individual law schools, such
efforts will likely be insufficient. It is no surprise that the last significant changes to
status hierarchy resulted from a combination of push and pull forces, including
changes to the ABA standards for security of position.103 New reforms will likely
require similar dynamics. As is already evident, faculty have been actively working
to dismantle these silos for decades, but more widespread progress in this area will
require much broader, profession-wide commitment.104
Ultimately, from the faculty caste system to the curve, law schools have made
themselves into “bias-reinforcing structure[s].” 105 Now that the hierarchies are
101

See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 297 (noting that status erosion for clinical professors
results in them having less influence at their schools and on legal education more generally).
102
See, e.g., Mary Beth Beazley, “Riddikulus!”: Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty
and the Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79 (1998–2000) (dispelling
various biases and describing how these biases “shape-shift” to ensure legal writing
professors are kept in subordinate roles including that legal writing is so “easy” that it is not
“intellectual” and so “hard” that tenure is inappropriate because burn-out is inevitable); see
generally Edwards, supra note 55 (detailing the trouble with categorizing law school
professors); Allen et al., supra note 24, at 526–27 (describing the work traditionally
performed by women as “pink-collar work” and noting that women are more likely than men
to participate in uncompensated work that does not lead to promotion); Bowman, supra note
83, at 24–25 (noting the disparity between “importance” of legal writing and how professors
of those courses are treated under the ABA standards).
103
See Melissa H. Weresh, The History of American Bar Association Standard 405(d):
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 24 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL. WRITING INST. 125
(2020) (discussing the history of changes to Standard 405 including efforts to refine and
revise standards 405(b), 405 (c), and 405 (d) and the most recent review period between
2008–2014 during which status hierarchies based on position were maintained).
104
See, e.g., Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Toward a Disciplinary Pedagogy for Legal
Education, 1 SAVANNAH L. REV. 69 (2014) (calling for law schools to adopt a writingcentered pedagogy across the curriculum); Mary Nicol Bowman & Lisa Brodoff, Cracking
Student Silos: Linking Legal Writing and Clinical Learning Through Transference, 25
CLINICAL L. REV. 269 (2019) (discussing how to teach skills for transfer across the
curriculum).
105
Arnow-Richman, supra note 49, at 758 (“In the case of the bifurcated faculty,
however, the problem is one of the academy’s own making.”). Id. at 762.
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obvious, the question is: Will those who govern have the desire, courage, and
perseverance to dismantle them?
B. High-Stakes Summative Assessments
Unlike the periodic, criterion-based systems used in most professional
training, the law school exam serves virtually no pedagogic function; its
only function is ranking.106
Beginning with a student’s first semester, and especially following the first
year, final exam grades place students on a particular track. A student’s
track determines the ease with [which] she is able to ‘win’ at law school.107
At their best, assessments are part of an ongoing educational process in which
students acquire, practice, and evaluate skills. 108 Assessments can either be
formative or summative. Formative assessments provide students with feedback
about their strengths and weaknesses while learning new content and skills.
Summative assessments evaluate cumulative student learning at the end of a learning
cycle. Effective assessments—whether formative or summative—are teaching tools,
providing knowledge, motivation, and feedback to students and their teachers.109
Single, end-of-the-semester exams are rarely teaching tools.110 These exams
don’t reliably measure what a professor has taught, nor are they a fair indicator of
student effort or ability. 111 More importantly, most don’t reflect or assess the
cognitive skills lawyers use in practice.112 Writing over one hundred years ago, after
conducting a six-year study at Columbia Law School in the 1920s, Professor Ben
Wood concluded that while a single final exam was the most common form of law
school assessment, the “English prose answers to legal problems, written under
106

Cooper Davis, supra note 94, at 623.
Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School,
15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 93 (2013).
108
See DeShun Harris, Let’s Talk About Grading, Maybe: Using Transparency About
the Grading Process to Aid in Student Learning, 45 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (providing a useful discussion of the grading process); Deborah Waire Post, Power
and the Morality of Grading—A Case Study and a Few Critical Thoughts on Grade
Normalization, 65 UMKC L. REV. 777, 794 (1997) (describing guidelines for student
centered assessment).
109
See Robert C. Downs & Nancy Levit, If It Can’t Be Lake Woebegone . . . A
Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization Practices Academic
Evaluations Focus, 65 UMKC L. REV. 819, 822 (1997); Rose, supra note 5, at 137.
110
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 822.
111
See Post, supra note 108, at 778 (arguing that law school grading “has never been
about assessment or learning.”).
112
See Deborah Jones Merritt & Logan Cornett, Building a Better Bar: The Twelve
Building Blocks of Minimum Competence, INST. ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS. 1, 82–86
(2020) (discussing current bar exam and noting that closed-book, timed, multiple-choice
exams are a poor measure of minimum competence to practice law).
107
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examination conditions, do not seem to be adequate manifestations either of
knowledge or of thinking ability.”113 The same could be said today.
Designed to capture cumulative learning after the fact and to place students on
a spectrum in relation to one another, many 1L exams generally provide insufficient
feedback for students to learn from the assessment itself. 114 First, such exams,
particularly when curved, do not differentiate skill profiles and levels of mastery.115
Because of mandatory curves, discussed in the next section, students who performed
very differently are still likely to receive the same or similar final score, a B.116 After
receiving their grades, which already play an outsized role in the law student psyche,
most students cannot determine from the feedback they received (if any) where they
need to improve.117 Further, without criteria-referenced positive feedback, students
have little guidance about what worked—either in their studying or in exam
performance.118 Any utility students can glean from exam feedback often requires
initiative and sometimes even persistence. Because students don’t take the same
class for multiple semesters, and many never take another class from a particular
professor, feedback utility may be marginal. The hurdles placed before students to
revisit and reflect on their exams cause them to miss out on a key opportunity to
develop both cognitive and non-cognitive skills that are essential for ethical law
practice.
By and large, final exam grades from large casebook courses merely
communicate rank. For students whose grades fall into the bottom two quartiles after
the first semester, this message comes a little too late and often stings. As a recent
AccessLex report noted:
The first year of law school typically plays an outsized role in determining
eligibility for sought-after co-curricular experiences, such as law journal
membership. Prestigious and lucrative internships and the jobs that often
flow therefrom are typically open only to students who attained high

113

Ben D. Wood, The Measurement of Law School Work, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 338, 343

(1924).

114

See Kennedy, supra note 48, at 600 (describing the single, end-of-semester student
evaluation as “silly.”); Post, supra note 108, at 784 (“Law school testing is neither
assessment for accountability in the traditional sense nor assessment for improvement.”).
115
See Curcio, supra note 16, at 490 (noting that “in classes graded on a curve, grades
may leave students with a misimpression about their overall level of mastery” and that “B
students often have less than seventy percent of the total possible raw score points” in her
large-section curved courses).
116
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 823.
117
See Rose, supra note 5, at 137–39.
118
See id. at 137 (noting that frequent formative feedback helps students to develop
into self-motivated and independent learners).
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grades early on. Grades in later years are relevant but usually pale in
importance to the first year.119
Ultimately, semester after semester, students cram during reading period and then
promptly forget the subject matter, many recalling the entire exam process as
traumatic. These high-stakes, winner-takes-all exams create and recreate
destabilizing and destructive discomfort and foster fixed mindsets. 120 Such
discomfort is felt most profoundly and most harmfully by first-generation law
students and students from other historically marginalized backgrounds who often
have less knowledge of and access to a law school’s hidden curricula. Yet here we
are. Law professors, particularly in the first year, continue to assess students using
methods that are backed by little-to-no evidence that they successfully prepare
students to practice law competently.121 Additionally, this single-exam, high-stakes
assessment model has not kept pace with technology, learning theory, or the
employment landscape.122 It is long past time for law schools to shift “the balance
between doctrinal instruction and focused preparation for the delivery of legal
services” by abandoning high-stakes summative exams and restructuring assessment
in all first-year courses.123
Successful, ethical lawyers must be committed to continuous professional
development.124 Such development in educational theory is called self-directedness.
Self-directedness is one’s ability to assess their own strengths and weaknesses and
engage in growth.125 Lawyers must also build teamwork and collaboration skills,
accounting for the diversity of perspectives and experiences they will encounter

119

Aaron N. Taylor, Jason M. Scott & Josh Jackson, It’s Not Where You Start, It’s How
You Finish: Predicting Law School and Bar Success 1, 5 (AccessLex Inst., Working Paper
No. 21-03, 2021).
120
See id. (“Belief in the notion of fixed intellectual capacities is common among law
students. The very structure of legal education and its system of grading and sorting students
is rooted in a fixed mindset premise.”) (internal citation omitted).
121
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 824 (“It is often remarked [by professors]
that students need to learn how to analyze new and unknown fact situations because that is
what will walk through their doors when they are in practice.”).
122
See Rebecca Flanagan, Better by Design: Implementing Meaningful Change for the
Next Generation of Law Students, 71 ME. L. REV. 103, 111 (2018).
123
AM. BAR ASS’N, Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, Report and
Recommendations (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administ
rative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PM7-U9CL].
124
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). The
language in MRPR 1.1 specifically acknowledges that a lawyer owes a duty of competent
representation to their client, and that this requires “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
125
See Merritt & Cornett, supra note 112, at 80–82.
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when practicing law.126 Changing assessment focus away from high stakes, end-ofterm exams will enable law professors to attend to the calls for skills like teamwork,
cultural competence, and self-direction, which will make legal education more
meaningful and practical. 127 Single summative assessments simply are not
sufficient.128
Of course, change has a price. Abandoning high-stakes exams will require law
professors to reevaluate their instructional methods. It is both costly for law schools
and labor intensive for faculty to change their teaching and assessment methods. In
addition, tenure standards preferencing scholarship over teaching, large class sizes,
and pressure to create exams that result in a natural curve all work against a law
professor’s desire to create meaningful assessments that gauge student learning and
mastery against defined learning outcomes. These pressures also work against law
professors attempting to teach and assess soft and other non-cognitive skills that are
critical to ethical law practice.
Another barrier to abandoning high-stakes exams is the argument that 1L
grades provide important information because they are a statistically significant
predictor of bar performance.129 While true, studies reveal that law school grades
126
The ability to pursue self-directed learning is one of the twelve essential “building
blocks” for competent law practice identified in the IAALS multi-year study. Id.; see also
Chad Christensen, Preparing Law Students to Be Successful Lawyers, 69 J. LEGAL EDUC.
502, 504–07 (2020) (demonstrating that there has been very little progress in supporting law
students to work effectively with others despite an increase in skills and experiential learning
requirements during the period studied).
127
See generally Marjorie M. Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer
Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admissions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
620 (2011) (describing twenty-six factors of lawyering effectiveness); ANALYSIS: Survey
Grades Law Students’ Preparedness for Practice, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 31, 2022, 3:00
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-survey-grades-lawstudents-preparedness-for-practice [https://perma.cc/WG9C-SFFS] (identifying data
literacy, client communication, and legal tech as some of the additional skills lawyers should
be familiar with prior to practicing law).
128
Summative assessments have a role to play in legal education because they both
evaluate and communicate some measure of student learning. Many 1L professors go to great
lengths with their final exams to prepare students for the types of multiple choice they will
encounter on the Bar as it is currently structured. Some also specifically require students to
write their exams using the predictive office memo style they learned in their lawyering
classes, which directly supports lawyering skills. But a single summative assessment is
simply not sufficient.
129
See Taylor et al., supra note 119, at 17; see also Raul Ruiz, Leveraging Noncognitive
Skills to Foster Bar Exam Success: An Analysis of the Efficacy of the Bar Passage Program
at FIU Law, 99 NEB. L. REV. 141, 195 (2020) (demonstrating through data analysis that 1L
grades at FIU College of Law are statistically significant in determining bar exam
performance); Robert R. Kuehn & David R. Moss, A Study of the Relationship Between Law
School Coursework and Bar Exam Outcomes, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 623, 635 (2019) (noting
that 1L GPA “strongly signals at the end of the first year which group of students is most
likely to fail the bar exam and therefore might merit additional assistance over the next two
years.”).
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overall—including those in skills, seminar, and clinic courses—are also a strong
predictor of bar performance.130 Since performance in courses that do not rely on
high-stakes final exams also correlate with bar passage, the single, end-of-term exam
does not need to be preserved merely to provide a data point. Where bar passage
rates are concerned, data suggest that increases in GPA after the first semester of 1L
year correlate with higher bar passage rates, particularly for those students who
received below average first semester grades.131 Perhaps not surprising, how and
whether a student improves matters for bar passage. 132 Although “limited and
muddied,”133 taken together, these recent studies suggest that early assessment to
evaluate student skills and targeted interventions to provide students with
appropriate support would increase performance on the current bar exam. 134
Changing assessment modalities will also enable law schools to better prepare
students for changes to professional licensing that are on the near horizon.135 In sum,
more assessments benefit students, not fewer.
With the import of assessment and grades in mind, summative assessments
should be only one small part of the assessment equation. Since the 2014 changes to
ABA Standard 314, law schools have been required to use formative and summative
assessment methods to evaluate student work and improve student learning.136 But
again, so far, these reform efforts have been limited. In particular, Standard 314 left
assessment in 1L classes relatively unchanged. That is because Standard 314 allows
law schools to satisfy assessment requirements by demonstrating that they use both
formative and summative assessments in the program of legal study—at some
time.137 The ABA does not require professors to use both kinds of assessment in
every course.138 While it is unlikely that the ABA will adopt more assessment edicts
130

See Taylor et al., supra note 119, at 17–19, 23.
Ruiz, supra note 129, at 196–98.
132
This data point requires further analysis because most law schools substantially relax
their grade curve policies in upper-level courses. See Taylor et al., supra note 119, at 17–19.
133
Kuehn & Moss, supra note 129, at 630.
134
See id. at 627–30 (summarizing studies); see also Ruiz, supra note 129 (discussing
bar preparation support at FIU College of Law).
135
We do not know what the NCBE NextGen will look like exactly, or which
jurisdictions will adopt it, but we do know that it will attempt to assess less “content” and
many more “skills” See Snapshot of NextGen Bar Exam, NCBEX.ORG,
https://nextgenbarexam.ncbex.org/ [https://perma.cc/LE6X-A8L8] (last visited May 2,
2022).
136
Assessment of Student Learning, ABA Standard 314, AM. BAR ASS’N 24 (requiring
schools to use both summative and formative assessments). For a history of efforts to adopt
ABA Standard 314 (Assessment of Student Learning), see Steven C. Bahls, Adoption of
Student Learning Outcomes: Lessons for Systemic Change in Legal Education, 67 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 376, 400–02 (2018).
137
See Bahls, supra note 136, at 402 (“The interpretations to [Standard 314] make it
clear that the requirements for both formative and summative assessment are not applied at
the course level, but must be applied at points the law school chooses over the span of a
student’s education.”).
138
Id.
131
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in the short term, it is possible that new studies will confirm a positive correlation
between the use of more frequent assessment and bar passage, which could
encourage law faculty to include more formative assessments in their courses.
Already one study has shown that performance in legal writing has a statistically
significant impact on bar passage.139 Such evidence suggests that law schools should
encourage law professors to develop and use pedagogically appropriate formative
assessments, like those used in legal writing courses, and rely less on high stakes
summative assessments whether the ABA makes them do so or not.
Changing assessment practice is also important because it can re-center student
voices and student learning even in large enrollment courses.140 All 1L professors
should adopt formative assessments and embed them in learning experiences that
cultivate constructive discomfort—that tactile space where deep learning occurs.141
Practice, assessment, and feedback should be the norm rather than something
reserved for one week each semester. Through iterative, multi-dimensional learning
modules based in a problem-solving model, students can develop into adept learners
and exceptional lawyers. 142 In such a model, skills, values, and knowledge are
purposefully, constantly, and transparently intertwined.
By moving student focus away from end-of-term exams, law professors can
also slow down a bit on the march through doctrine and black letter law. To be frank,
it’s impossible to get through one-hundred pages of a torts textbook in a single class
while also grappling with narrative backstories, rhetorical moves, how culture both
produces and shifts legal meaning, and how power is allocated in the law. Slowing
down allows professors to meet students where they are while also encouraging them
to take up the “ambitious reinvestigation of the law[,]” 143 one that reveals the
“porousness of the barrier between the law and the world . . . .”144 It also allows both
professors and students to investigate and cultivate their roles and identities in the
139

Kuehn & Moss, supra note 129, at 629 (discussing results from Texas Tech study).
See Abrams, supra note 17, at 929–34 (calling on law professors to abandon their
reverence for the professor-centric Socratic method and create a skills-, student-, client-, and
community-centered Socratic method grounded in formative assessment).
141
See generally Elizabeth M. Bloom, Creating Desirable Difficulties: Strategies for
Reshaping Teaching and Learning in the Law School Classroom, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
115 (2018) (providing helpful suggestions on designing courses with effective formative and
summative assessments); Sarah J. Schendel, What You Don’t Know (Can Hurt You): Using
Exam Wrappers to Foster Self-Assessment Skills in Law Students, 40 PACE L. REV. 154
(2019) (describing strategies to improve student self-assessment and learning).
142
For suggestions on how to incorporate the service-learning, experiential model into
the 1L year, see THE NEW 1L, supra note 19. For suggestions on redesigning legal education
to focus on authentic lawyering assignments—both simulated and live client—and
embedding legal writing in every course, see Flanagan, supra note 122, at 106–07. For a
visionary law school where learning and assessment are based on proficiency for competent
law practice and advancing justice, see Claudia Angelos, Mary Lu Bilek, & Joan W.
Howarth, The Deborah Jones Merritt Center for the Advancement of Justice, 82 OHIO ST.
L.J. 911 (2021).
143
Akbar, supra note 36, at 370.
144
Id. at 369.
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legal profession. As Professor Cooper Davis convincingly argues, “[p]racticing
lawyers do not just play logic games. We serve our clients and the larger society in
quests that test us in logic, psychology, public policy judgment, self-awareness,
performativity, and ethics.”145 Law students deserve opportunities in their first year
to build these skills.
As a result, first-year courses should include, and first-year assessments should
capture, more of what practicing lawyers actually do. This approach requires a
mental shift away from focusing on what professors are teaching and a turn toward
focusing on what students are learning. Along the way, assessments can and will
remain particular to the professors who create them. Similarly, assessing student
performance will remain subjective. Some professors will prioritize issue spotting,
others the ability to sort through a tangle of facts and extract relevant facts from
irrelevant. Still, others will style their problems to reflect law practice and the types
of documents lawyers produce. But by emphasizing metacognition—through
iterating, reflecting, and calibrating—law schools will be able to graduate more selfdirected and fulfilled lawyers.
C. Hiding Behind the Curve
“Grading as practiced teaches the inevitability and also the justice of
hierarchy, a hierarchy that is at once false and unnecessary.”146
“Either [students] worked hard (high curve) or they didn’t (low curve) or
they were generally superior in aptitude (high curve) or they were not (low
curve).”147
Curves are the norm, and they should be abandoned.148 In 1976 only 9% of 102
ABA-accredited law schools surveyed had adopted mandatory grade distribution for
at least some of their courses.149 By 1995, this number had jumped dramatically,
with 84% of 116 ABA-accredited law schools reporting that they had some form of
grade normalization policy in place.150 Of those schools with grade normalization
policies, 78% of schools described them as formal, written policies.151 As of January
145

Cooper Davis, supra note 94, at 623.
Kennedy, supra note 48, at 600.
147
Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 830.
148
In this section, “curve,” “grade normalization,” grade norming,” “mandatory grade
distribution,” and “norm-referenced grading” describe a grading practice where grades are
standardized and reflect how a student performed in relation to other students. In practice,
law school grading policies use means, medians, and prescribed distributions. Sometimes
they use all three.
149
Id. at 820.
150
Id. at 836. See also Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices,
44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415 (1994) (describing results of a 1993 study of law school grading
policies).
151
Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 836.
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2022, there are 196 ABA-accredited law schools that confer a J.D. 152 Of those
schools, 191 had grade policies publicly available on the internet and 144 of them
explicitly acknowledge that 1L courses must follow specific grade normalization
policies.153 Even many first-year legal writing courses are now curved.154
Certainly, curves have their benefits.155 Paramount is that they create greater
consistency among professors and across sections.156 Grade normalization can serve
as an equity measure to address widespread grading disparities among professors.157
The theory goes, law schools cannot control whether law professors are skilled at
teaching or assessment. 158 What they can control though, is whether generally
equivalent student groups dispersed to various sections receive a reasonably similar
grade distribution.

152

List of ABA-Approved Law Schools in Alphabetical Order, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools
/in_alphabetical_order [https://perma.cc/D448-CNWM] (last visited May 2, 2022)
(excluding three law schools identified as on Teach-Out plans).
153
L. Danielle Tully, Law School Grading Policies (May 16, 2022) (unpublished
spreadsheet) (on file with author) [hereinafter Tully, Grading Policies]. Twenty-eight
publicly available policies do not explicitly state whether the law school requires grade
norming. Sixteen schools explicitly “suggest” or “advise” faculty to norm grades in various
ways. Only three law schools specifically state that professors are not required to normalize
grades: Liberty University Law School, University of Wyoming College of Law, and Yale
Law School.
154
Rose, supra note 5, at 131. The history of legal writing courses adopting both grades
and curves is intertwined with the status movement and is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, from a statistical standpoint curving classes with thirty students or fewer is
problematic because the sample size is too small. From a pedagogical standpoint, courses
focused on individual growth and skills mastery are an odd fit for curves that compare
students to one another rather than to mastery of established learning outcomes.
Theoretically, every student, particularly in a small course, should be able to demonstrate
competency with enough motivation and support.
155
See generally Joshua M. Silverstein, In Defense of Mandatory Curves, 34 UALR L.
REV. 253 (2012).
156
Rose, supra note 5, at 127. For example, in Professor Woods’ six-year study of
Columbia Law School courses he determined that both course material and instructional
methods were fairly consistent across classes, but that grades varied dramatically from one
professor to the next. Wood, supra note 113, at 351. He suggested that law professor
subjectivity rather than student acumen lay at the heart of the grading discrepancy. Id.; see
Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 825 (discussing wide-ranging grade disparities in the first
year at UMKC before the faculty adopted a required curve).
157
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 843 (highlighting that 69% of responding
law schools stated that they adopted grade normalization policies because of “fairness,
equality among sections, or fears of inequitable grading”). Unfortunately, legal writing
courses adopted grades and curves to be taken seriously by students and other faculty and to
be more fully integrated into the first-year curriculum. See Rose, supra note 5, at 133.
158
A discussion of the “teaching” pillar, namely law professor training in pedagogy and
assessment, is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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Students, however, don’t generally experience fixed curves as an equity
measure. Instead, “[s]tudents generally experience these grades as almost totally
arbitrary—unrelated to how much [they] worked, how much [they] liked the subject,
how much [they] thought [they] understood going into the exam, and what [they]
thought about the class and the teacher.” 159 Additionally, the notion that student
groups across sections are “generally equivalent” because students within those
sections have similar undergraduate GPA distributions ignores the fact that
individual students carry with them very uneven burdens and benefits, particularly
as they enter law school.160
Also, law school grading policies and curves vary wildly from institution to
institution.161 Only a few law schools have dispensed with letter grades entirely, but
even they have maintained mechanisms to rank students.162 Those with grades retool
their curve from time to time to realign themselves with peer schools and labor

159

Kennedy, supra note 48, at 600.
See Feingold & Souza, supra note 107, at 92–102 (discussing “racial unevenness”
and how it impacts students of color before, during, and after exams). Feingold and Souza’s
observations can be extended, albeit differently, to students who face uneven burdens due to
work and family obligations or other factors that impact exclusive focus on law study. See
also Shaun Ossei-Owusu, For Minority Law Students, Learning the Law Can Be
Intellectually Violent, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 15, 2020, 11:23 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/
voice/article/for_minority_law_students_learning_the_law_can_be_intellectually_violent
[https://perma.cc/HG6H-9JH5]; Christopher Williams, Gatekeeping the Profession, 26
CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 171, 175–79 (2020) (explaining the impact of social
stratification and how it serves as a gatekeeping function for Black law students).
161
See Tully, Grading Policies, supra note 153. For example, California Western
grading policies for the first trimester of the 1L year include an “allowable range” of 5–10%
for A to A+ grades and 5–10% for D+ to F grades. CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW
STUDENT HANDBOOK 2021–2022, CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW 1, 24–25 (2021–
2022). In comparison, UCLA’s 1L grade curve mandates that the median cannot be above a
3.3 and sets the following grade distribution ranges: A or A+ (15 –20%), A- (20–25%), B+
(30–35%), B and below (25–35%). Academic Standards and Related Procedures, UCLA
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/c.php?g=843027&p=6027635)
[https://perma.cc/9F5P-YJ82] (last visited July 1, 2022).
162
See Rose, supra note 5, at 130 (noting that Harvard, Yale, and Stanford have a
modified pass/fail system). For example, Harvard Law School grades are Honors, Pass, Low
Pass, and Fail. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL HANDBOOK OF ACADEMIC POLICIES 2021–2022,
HARVARD 1, 34 (2021–2022). These marks convert into a standard GPA. Id. at 36. In
addition, “Deans Scholar Prize” can be awarded in certain classes and this grade counts as 5
when calculated into GPA. Id. at 34, 36. In comparison, Northeastern University School of
Law (NUSL) does not award alpha numeric grades and instead students receive narrative
assessments. While students may still earn honorifics (high honors or honors), NUSL does
not calculate GPA or class rank. Degree Requirements, NORTHEASTERN LAW,
https://law.northeastern.edu/academics/programs/jd/degree-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/
SQ3R-7AWN] (last visited May 2, 2022).
160
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markets. 163 Arguably such retooling is meant to support students, whether by
lowering toxic competition and fostering a more collegial educational environment
or by helping students to compete on more equal footing with students in similar
grade bands at different schools. Both aims are laudable, but the result—healthier
law schools and high post-graduation employment rates—is possible without any
curve at all.
Embraced during a period where law students descended from a fairly
homogenous group and where legal education was viewed as a scientific inquiry,
curves are now perhaps far less equitable than previously believed. Coupled with
the high-stakes, end-of-term assessment discussed above, fixed curves reward
students who have entered law school with particular backgrounds, experiences, and
demonstrated skills and bestow upon them additional grade wealth.164 In so doing,
law schools prioritize a narrow set of skills over the intellectual, emotional, and
interpersonal versatility that ethical lawyering requires. 165 As Professor Peggy
Cooper Davis notes:
At the end of a first semester or year, the fixed curve sets students on rankordered tracks. Track mobility is always possible, but it is not easy.
Ranking well in the first year boosts confidence and provides easier access
to mentoring and to collegial learning on journal boards and in selective
courses. Ranking poorly reduces confidence and inhibits access to
important forms of collegial learning.166
What began as an effort to achieve some measure of grade fairness has gone
terribly wrong. Curves increase student stress, foster an unhealthy competitive
atmosphere, and interfere with deep learning. 167 In addition, rather than
communicating to students whether and to what extent they can demonstrate
163

For example, New York University School of Law changed its grading policies in
2020 after the SBA submitted a proposal to amend the curve. Starting with Fall 2020, the 1L
grading curve no longer requires any grade lower than a B. Academic Policies Guide:
Grading System and Academic Standards, NYU LAW, https://www.law.nyu.edu/academic
services/academic-policies/grading-system-academic-standards
[https://perma.cc/53XGVTY2] (last visited May 2, 2022). Columbia Law School’s 1L curve also does not require
any grade lower than a B. REGISTRATION SERVICES, GRADING CURVE FOR FIRST-YEAR
COURSES, COLUMBIA L. SCH. 1, 1 (2012).
164
See Feingold & Souza, supra note 107, at 93–94 (describing first-year grades as
gatekeepers and arguing the “resources and rewards” that come with grade wealth “become
immediately self-perpetuating”).
165
See Cooper Davis, supra note 94, at 619 (law schools “sharpen[] minds by
narrowing them”).
166
Id. at 622; Kennedy, supra note 48, at 600 (“The system generates a rank ordering
of students based on grades, and students learn that there is little or nothing they can do to
change their place in that ordering or to change the way the school generates it.”).
167
See Rose, supra note 5, at 124; Cooper Davis, supra note 94, at 622 (“The fixed
curve interferes with learning. It motivates students to work for grades rather than for
comprehension or skill development.”).
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competency in course learning outcomes, curves merely communicate to students
where they sort in relation to their classmates.168 In fact, the 2007 Best Practices
report went so far as to say that “[a] bell curve outcome actually reflects a failure of
instruction.”169
Ironically, as faculties embraced grade normalization, the ABA pushed toward
assessing competency-based outcomes that are seemingly at odds with normreferenced grading. As mentioned earlier, every law school is now required to
publish explicit learning outcomes, develop assessment measures to determine
whether students are meeting those outcomes, and regularly retool what and how
law is taught. While these assessment requirements are geared towards evaluating
the effectiveness of the program of legal education rather than individual student
performance, there is a significant tension between the ABA’s new assessment
requirements and traditional adherence to grade curves. This tension exists because
competency-based instruction shifts the focus away from assessing what professors
have taught, to evaluating what students have learned. This shift, and the underlying
goal of graduating students prepared for competent law practice, suggests that law
professors must spend more effort helping individual students improve their
knowledge and skills. 170 If the new focus on assessment works as intended and
student competency levels increase as a result, grade normalization policies should
not prevent communicating to students that they have met or even exceeded target
competencies—even if that means they all have.
Mandatory curves are also not compatible with aspirations for a healthy and
ethical profession. Rather than sorting students, faculty should be focused on
criteria-referenced grading where they evaluate a student’s performance in relation
to well-defined competencies, not on how the student’s performance stacks up
against another student’s performance.171 As Educating Lawyers noted in 2007, “the
implicit pedagogical philosophy underlying criterion-referenced assessment is that
the fundamental purpose of professional education is not sorting but producing as
many individuals proficient in legal reasoning and competent practice as
possible.”172
Writing almost forty years ago, Professor Duncan Kennedy argued that “the
process of differentiating students into bad, better, and good could simply be
168

See Rose, supra note 5, at 143.
STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 182.
170
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 856 (noting incompatibility of grade
normalization policies and competency-based curricula). But see Silverstein, supra note 155,
at 284–96 (arguing against the critique that curves are incompatible with criterion-referenced
grading).
171
See Rose, supra note 5, at 124; see John Bliss and David Sandomierski, Learning
Without Grade Anxiety: Lessons from the Pass/Fail Experiment in North American J.D.
Programs, OHIO NORTHERN UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (documenting results from
empirical study examining whether pass/fail grading diminishes student learning and
concluding that alternate grading policies tend to alleviate anxiety with limited negative
impact on student motivation or learning).
172
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 168.
169
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dispensed with, without the slightest detriment to the quality of legal services.”173
He further suggested that law schools “could graduate the vast majority of all the
law students in the country at the level of technical proficiency now achieved by a
small minority in each institution[]”174 if they focused on skills training and provided
frequent detailed formative feedback to students while they were learning the skills.
The reforms Kennedy called for match those echoed many times since, yet even the
drive toward outcomes-based assessment and preparing practice-ready lawyers
doesn’t seem to have affected the beloved and reviled curve. Instead, law schools
publish learning outcomes and professors include them on their syllabi, but by and
large 1L courses still issue grades based on a single, high stakes, curved, final exam.
There are risks to abandoning the curve. The original opposition to grade
normalization—that it is an incursion on academic freedom—fails whether you are
on the side of keeping or throwing out the curve175 Academic freedom is intended to
protect intellectual freedom around teaching, research, and scholarship from
institutional or governmental manipulation or censure.176 But, few professors would
be likely to point to a political or ideological principle they are attempting to espouse
or protect through their current grading policies.177 Even if academic freedom is
invoked, freedom—particularly in the educational setting—is not absolute. This
privilege comes with responsibilities, particularly responsibilities to our students.
Grade subjectivity also remains a real concern, but it should not stand in the
way of abandoning the curve. Even with a fixed curve, numerous “accidental
factors” impact grades: language usage preference, where a student’s paper was
graded in reference to others, time of day, grader interruptions; the list goes on.178
Ultimately, the only thing we know for sure right now is that different professors
grade differently. If law schools want to address grading practices, they can through
faculty development workshops.179 Such training would be useful whether faculties
opt to jettison the curve or not. In addition, rather than trying to flatten this
subjectivity by stacking students up against one another, law professors should be
173

Kennedy, supra note 48, at 600.
Id.
175
Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 848–52 (discussing the academic freedom
critique against mandatory curves).
176
See id., at 849–50 (describing academic freedom concept and noting “[t]he only real
infringement is that a normalization system deprives the professor of a modest amount of
power to coerce his or her ideas.”).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 825–26; see Linda R. Crane, Grading Law School Examinations: Making a
Case for Objective Exams to Cure What Ails “Objectified” Exams, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV.
785, 789–91 (2000) (noting that professors will grade exams that are easier to read more
favorably, particularly if they do not use an answer key, which results in professors grading
based on how they “feel” about an answer).
179
See Harris, supra note 108 (noting that law professors receive minimal training on
how to create or grade assessments and that faculties should both discuss grading in their
institutions and engage in specific faculty development workshops focused on grading and
assessment).
174
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accounting for the subjectivity in their assessments and putting in guard rails to
minimize accidental factors. Criterion-referenced assessment is one such guardrail
where professors tie their assessment of student work to specific and transparent
competency standards. Anonymous grading, a long-standing practice in largeenrollment classes, is another such guardrail. This practice should also be adopted
by professors teaching skills classes wherever possible.180
Finally, abandoning the curve may, in the short-term, impact job placement.181
It is no secret: Grades, and accompanying class rank, are used as a confidence
decoy—signaling to would-be employers that a particular individual is “safe” to
hire.182 Law students are hired for coveted summer positions by demonstrating that
they rank higher on the sorting ladder than their peers after the first semester of law
school. 183 Many employers may be unwilling to familiarize themselves with
different grading systems and, because they compare candidates against one another,
it is unclear whether they would take the time to ascertain a specific applicant’s
competencies.184 Refusing to sort, then, I suspect, would likely be most detrimental
to students attending law schools ranked lower than the T14.185 It may also unfairly
burden historically marginalized students at any law school whose grades, rather
than historic networks, may open previously closed doors. 186 This particular risk
requires both further study and careful planning to ensure that any grade policy
180

For suggestions on debiasing feedback where anonymous grading may not be
feasible see Anne D. Gordon, Better than Our Biases: Using Psychological Research to
Inform Our Approach to Inclusive, Effective Feedback, 27 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 236–48
(2021).
181
See Post, supra note 108, at 798–99 (discussing student concerns about competing
for jobs as a factor favoring grade normalization).
182
See LANFORD WILSON, SYMPATHETIC MAGIC 71 (1998) (“Don: Mrs. Melon says
they’re considered an arbiter of taste or something. If they take a piece, several other
museums will follow suit. They’re a kind of confidence decoy. Barbara: I don’t know what
that is. Don: You’ve seen the big white swan decoys? They’re called confidence decoys.
Hunters use them on ducks. Swans won’t swim somewhere that’s dangerous. So [sic] a
confidence decoy makes the ducks believe the lake is safe.”).
183
See Silverstein, supra note 155, at 291 (noting that students’ grades are always going
to be used comparatively).
184
See Downs & Levit, supra note 109, at 824.
185
See Feingold & Souza, supra note 107, at 93 (“Since GPA is often the first thing a
potential employer looks at, perhaps in conjunction with the student’s law school, final
exams heavily determine a student’s initial career opportunities.”).
186
See John Bliss and David Sandomierski, Pass for Some, Fail for Others: An
Empirical Analysis of Law School Grading Changes in the Early Covid-19 Pandemic, (under
peer review) (on-file with author) (documenting results from empirical study examining
whether pass/fail grading achieved intended equity goals and noting that the results for
historically underrepresented groups were mixed with many students from historically
underrepresented groups initially preferring an option for pass/fail because they wanted the
opportunity to demonstrate academic achievement to future employers). See also Williams,
supra note 160, at 193–96 (discussing how gates operate at every level of obtaining a law
degree, and how those gates impact post-graduation employment).
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changes account for and mitigate possible harm to historically marginalized
students.
Abandoning the curve is not the same as abandoning assessment or grading for
that matter. Rather, in conjunction with abandoning high-stakes, winner-takes-all
exams, abandoning the curve is a call to invest more thought and energy into
equitable, consistent, and effective assessments that communicate to students and to
their would-be employers where students excel and where they need to grow. For
the last forty years, scholars have been critiquing the gap between what is being
taught in law school and what is required for law practice. As law schools move
toward more dynamic, integrated, and transformative legal education, their
assessment measures and how they communicate mastery must keep pace. Neither
high-stakes exams nor mandatory curves should make the cut in a twenty-firstcentury law school.
CONCLUSION
Legal education reform is glacial. But merely tinkering around the edges is not
only insufficient it can be detrimental. With each new tinker, constituencies coalesce
around a new status quo, making further progress more challenging.
Even so, there is new momentum. Coalitions within and across schools are
forming and calling for institutional and system-wide change. The question is, will
they do more than listen, convene, and report? Will they vote to make change? Will
they allow their peers the same right to vote? Then, collectively, will they bring
about more robust and equitable curricular and assessment reform for their students?
If, as I suggest, we must remake the first year (and perhaps all three years), such
a project will require a power shift in institutions that have long been loath to add
seats at their decision-making tables. It will take courage to cede space and
reapportion everything from credit hours and assessments to hiring and admissions
targets. Ultimately, it will require both questioning and disrupting the processes and
structures—from required course sequences to faculty hierarchies—that continue to
reproduce inequality in the legal academy, in law practice, and in the law.
Law schools were not designed for our present moment, but we can meet the
challenge if we have the courage to ask: what am I, what are we, willing to give up?
To me, the answer is clear: we must first give up the faculty caste system, highstakes exams, and the curve.

